HENRY KISSINGER DIPLOMACY:
As per the author he states that diplomacy which is achieved by henry Kissinger.
THE NEW WORLD ORDER
According to the author perspective he states that according to the natural law every country has its own power that is intellectual to the entire international system in their own values. On 17th century, France they introduced modern approach based on nation state as an ultimate purpose. In 18th century Great Britain bought a concept balance of power which dominated European Union for 200 years.in 19th century Metternich Austria reshaped the European diplomacy to power politics. In 20th century he states that there is no change in the day to day activity of diplomacy. No country engaged themselves in undertaking alliances and commitments.
Later America has produced two contradictory attitudes at first the serve perfect democracy at home. At second the value the obligation crusade from them around the world, since the end of Second World War the independence were predominated. Both schools thought America is a beacon and of America as crusader, still foreign scepticism never dimmed the idealism of Woodrow Wilson, franklin Roosevelt or Ronald Reagan or the other presidents of America in 20th century the world needs peace in-order to apply America’s modern prescriptions. Both school of American experience is to create the idea of liberty. No other countries has chosen it. Thus the two approaches isolationist and missionary reflected as an underlying faith. Thus the United States of America possessed that they were the world best system of government in attaining peace since they joined in 1917.
John f Kennedy states that the America was very powerful that pay and price bear and burden to ensure success of liberty. In three decades America is less in position in all its needs. But the idea and concept where never felt comfortable.
Then Americans started thinking of foreign policies and European policies they were in a sought of dilemma after the war they need to be balanced and challenge the world whereas Europeans had a stable power for many years they had balanced of power which couldn’t satisfy the international order.
Adam smith explains about the wealth of nature invisible hand in the individual economic hands and explains different concept of domestic harmony in America.
Western politicians who last year advocated bombing Syria now ask whether Damascus should be treated as a tacit ally against Islamic State. John Kerry talks of Iran as a possible partner in that war, while David Cameron meets the country’s president in New York. The quote of the summer from the president of the United States was that “we don’t have a strategy” on how to prevent a conflagration in the Middle East. Yet as old enmities and alliances dissolve and re form at high speed, we are having to develop one, and fast.
One person who has never lacked a strategy is the former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger, now 91. However, his thoughtful new book aims not so much to advocate specific policies as to portray the shape of the world over the past 2000 years or so, with reflections on where it will go in the next 50.
The book circles much of the globe, covering India, Europe, China and the Middle East. Four specific conceptions of “order” attract most of his attention: the European system, specifically its Westphalian model of sovereign states with equal status within the system; an Islamic system based on a wider idea of an ummah, or community; a Chinese system based on traditional ideas of the Middle Kingdom as a great regional power; and the American order, finding a new purpose a century ago under Woodrow Wilson, eventually dominant across the globe, and now under unprecedented pressure.
The book draws on a wide range of historical examples to make points about present-day issues. Unsurprisingly, Kissinger spends considerable time on the position of China in the international order, noting its central place in Asia for all but the past century or two. He characterises China’s historical role in East Asia as “conceptual”, whereas that of the US is “pragmatic”, the former shaped by a long history of external attacks on its borders. Certainly the historical basis to Chinese behaviour has emerged ever more clearly in the past few years, as leaders in Beijing have expressed a desire for a prominent global influence based on longstanding ideas of China as a great power. However, there is plenty of pragmatism in Chinese behaviour, too. Today, Beijing feels that Washington is weak and that its commitment to the region is hedged; as a result, China and Japan’s leaders each now claim that the other’s military ambitions in the region are a reason to stockpile arms.
Kissinger uses his “adaptive cultural” thesis to criticise the nation-building project of George W Bush in Iraq. He notes that he was supportive of the original invasion of Iraq in 2003, but expresses scepticism about the value of Bush’s vision, which “proved beyond what the American public would support and what Iraqi society would accommodate”. In the end, withdrawal from Iraq resembled “Vietnamization” in 1973-5, with equally dispiriting results. Since the book went to press, the collapse of the al-Maliki government has left Iraq on the brink of dissolution and the new government under Haider al-Abdi is dependent on the success of western air strikes to consolidate power.
The author’s own orchestration of the opening of relations with China gives an extra piquancy to his views on Iran: if the US can engage with one isolated regional superpower, why not another? Yet although he gives a detailed and nuanced account of Iran’s sense of its own imperial heritage over the centuries, he argues unequivocally that Tehran today is not Beijing in 1972. The China of the Cultural Revolution was vulnerable to the USSR and therefore needed to befriend the US to balance its enemies: “No such incentive is self-evident in Iranian-western relations.” Perhaps, but the kaleidoscopic changes of this summer may have changed the situation with regard to Iran, too, as Islamic State in Iraq and Levant is a threat to Tehran as well as to the west. Furthermore, the Iranian regime, however nasty it is, has the capacity for change (as the election of President Rouhani makes clear), and also shows no signs of collapsing (unlike Syria or Iraq). Realism might mean seizing the opportunity for a reorientation in the region that was not evident even a short while ago.
The book is described as “the summation of Henry Kissinger’s thinking about history, strategy and statecraft”. What, then, is the worldview that emerges from these pages? Readers of this newspaper may associate Kissinger with the exercise of American power to impose outcomes preferred by Washington, a view expressed forcefully in Christopher Hitchens’s polemic The Trial of Henry Kissinger (2001). However, the nature of American power as a whole has become much clearer in the past half century, revealing different strengths and flaws as regards international intervention. Lyndon Johnson and George W Bush were perhaps the presidents most unsuited to compromise with local realities in the developing countries (in Vietnam and Iraq respectively), and Ronald Reagan the most willing to confront the USSR in the emergence of the “new cold war” of the early 1980s. Over the same sweep of time, Truman and Acheson, Nixon and Kissinger, and George W Bush and James Baker now seem more considered and pragmatic practitioners.
That changing perspective explains why the book accords with liberal sensitivities in a way that would have seemed unlikely in the 1970s. The view that an international order cannot be created simply in a monochrome western image would find little resistance from the left. There is a wistfulness too for an era when the compelling power of governments and individuals could change the path of international relations (something harder to do in an era of flighty capital and transnational corporations), and a reminder that if broadly liberal regimes do not create order, there are plenty of illiberal ones that will.
The book also enables us to assess Kissinger’s own era in government in historical perspective. Few would now dispute the wisdom of ending China’s isolation from the “family of nations”. He reminds us of the importance of 1972-3, Nixon’s high point in foreign policy (Kissinger was national security adviser, before becoming secretary of state): as well as the opening to China, this year saw the end of the American troop presence in Vietnam, detente in eastern Europe, and peace agreements in the Middle East (after an Arab-Israeli war that could have led to major conflagration). There were of course darker aspects of that era, including the bombing of North Vietnamese strongholds in Cambodia that worsened a domestic crisis and allowed the murderous Khmer Rouge to come to power, and the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile. Yet when we look back at the 1970s as an era of crisis both domestic and international, it is remarkable how much of the international politics of that decade has come out on the positive side of the ledger and how a wider crisis was averted. Kissinger notes that “nuclear weapons must not be permitted to turn into conventional arms”. This statement seems unexceptionable until one recalls that the 1964 Republican candidate for US president was Barry Goldwater, who advocated using atomic bombs in Vietnam. In contrast, it was the Nixon and Ford administrations that negotiated the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks talks in 1969-72 that reduced nuclear tensions in Europe.
Kissinger was a key shaper of a world order that remained stable for a quarter century or more until our own post-cold war era. This urgently written book is a fine account of world order in the longue duree, and also a memorandum to future generations of policymakers that the next half-century will be no easier to manage than the most recent one.
THE HINGE: THEODORE ROOSEVELT OR WOODROW WILSON
In the book’s second chapter, “The Hinge: Theodore Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson,” Kissinger sets up the diplomatic dichotomy that is to control much of the remainder of his argument. He presents Theodore Roosevelt accurately as a pragmatic practitioner of the Realpolitik, whereas he presents Woodrow Wilson, also with complete accuracy, as the idealist whose vision of a League of Nations, the precursor of the United Nations, won him a Nobel Peace Prize although he did not achieve sufficient domestic support for his own country to become a member of the league that he had spawned.
Herein, according to Kissinger, lies the major dilemma with which United Sates diplomats and statesmen have been forced to deal during the period of their country’s ascendancy to the position of world power that it has enjoyed through most of the twentieth century. The great diplomatic tug-of-war for the United States has been between its ideals and the frequently daunting realities of the world situation. American ideals led the nation into involvement in Vietnam (to which Kissinger devotes three chapters, tracing the evolution of that conflict from the Harry S Truman administration to Richard Nixon’s face-saving extrication of United States forces from the situation), in Somalia, and in Haiti. The spectre of Vietnam, however, has kept the United States from further entangling involvements in Cuba, Serbo-Croatia, Rwanda, and other hot spots throughout the world.
Given the idealistic context of United States diplomacy during the mid-twentieth century, Kissinger does not fault the military and diplomatic advisers to Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson who advised escalation of the Vietnam conflict, although such an escalation in retrospect proved disastrous. The bitter memory of Vietnam has had a profound effect upon United States involvement in regional conflicts for the last quarter of the twentieth century.
Early in his first chapter, Kissinger points to the inherent contradictions in the United States’ practice of diplomacy. Born out of revolution against a monarchy, universally touted as a bastion of liberty and a land of incredible opportunity, the United States believes unerringly in political self-determination. So convinced are its citizens and its statesmen of the rectitude of its form of government, however, that they have spread its influence into every corner of the earth with a missionary zeal, sometimes imposing freedom upon populaces that had never been accustomed to living in a free society. The downside of this is evident, for example, in Haiti, where President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, elected by the people through a democratic process strongly encouraged and monitored by the United States, was for a long time unable to assume power, which was quickly grasped by a disgruntled military junta after the elections had made clear the will of the people.
FROM UNIVERSALITY TO EQULIBRIUM: RICHILIEU, WILLIAM OF ORANGE AND PIT